Monday, August 6, 2018

Are "Nationwide" Sales on Amazon Sufficient to Show Injury in M.D.Fla. for Venue Purposes?


Thursday, LLC and Klhip, Inc. are both retailers that use Amazon to sell nail clippers online.  Klhip filed a number of claims with Amazon about Thursday.  In response, Amazon would take Thursday down and investigate.  Each time, Klhip's allegations have been found baseless (and Thursday's Amazon presence has been restored). 

Thursday, a Florida corporation located in Clearwater, sued Klhip for unfair competition, tortious interference, and violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUPTA) (among other claims).  Klhip, whose CEO lives in Idaho, sought to transfer the case there pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) (arguing that venue in M.D. Fla. was entirely improper) or 28 U.S.C. 1404(b) (arguing that it would be more convenient to litigate in Idaho).

Concerning the propriety of venue (28 U.S.C. 1391(b)), the Court quickly disposed of Klhip's challenge.  Thursday notes that it sells thousands of its nail clippers in this district, and Klhip's statements about Thursday (to Amazon) have hurt Thursday in this district, thus supporting jurisdiction  The Court agreed.

Concerning transfer for convenience of the parties, the Court rejected Klhip's argument that Idaho would be more convenient.  The analysis followed the typical analysis in a 1404 decision, but notably noticed the importance of the FDUPTA claim, explaining that: "[a] district judge in Florida indisputably has the advantage in an action based on Florida law and is most adept at applying Florida law.  As a result [familiarity with the governing law] distinctly disfavors transfer."

Motion to transfer, denied.
Thursday, LLC v. Klhip, Inc., Case No. 8:17-cv-1587-T-36AEP (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2018) (J. Honeywell)

Monday, July 30, 2018

Is it a good idea to ignore the Court's orders?


Taser International, Inc. sued Phazzer Electronics, Inc. for patent infringement.  The discovery history appears tortured.  Taser pursued a number of motions to compel discovery responses.  Phazzer produced some documents (and apparently no emails), but the documents conflicted with representations Phazzer had made about its corporate structure and relationships with third parties. 

Then came the attempts to schedule depositions of "the handful of critical witnesses associated with Phazzer."  Apparently these critical witnesses for this closely-held company "are represented to be on vacation, out of the country, in surgery, or convalescing."  Taser had been attempting to schedule these depositions for 5 months.

With a Technology Tutorial scheduled in court, the Court ordered the parties and their counsel to attend in person, and cautioned that failure to do so could result in sanctions (including default judgment).  The day the Court entered that order, Phazzer's counsel filed a motion to withdraw.  That same day, the Court denied the motion to withdraw, and specifically ordered counsel to continue to represent Phazzer, notwithstanding counsel's representation of "irreconcilable differences."   The next day, Phazzer's counsel filed a "Notice of Termination of Legal Representation."   The Court struck that notice the same day because "because it is not a motion or a filing that is otherwise authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules."

Phazzer's corporate representative did not attend the Technology Tutorial, failed to attend the corporate deposition of Phazzer, and a number of other Phazzer witnesses did not attend their court ordered depositions. 

The court then set a hearing on Phazzer's counsel's renewed motion to withdraw, specifically ordering a representative of Phazzer to attend.  No corporate representative attended.  Denying Phazzer's motion to stay the case, the Magistrate Judge observed: "it appears that Phazzer, with the assistance of its counsel, is attempting in bad faith to further delay this litigation."

In light of this abusive practice, the Court granted Taser's request for sanctions, and imposed the following relief:

  • Striking of Phazzer's motion to dismiss;
  • default entered in favor of Taser and against Phazzer on all claims;
  • compensatory damages;
  • treble damages for "Defendant's willful infringement" and "willful false advertisement";
  • attorneys' fees and costs; and
  • a permanent injunction.

Notably, while the Court could not name the third-party manufacturers in the injunction (for due process concerns), the Court did note: "it is clear that nonparties who assist the enjoined party in violating the injunction may be held in contempt by this Court."

The injunction should be helpful with ceasing importation of these infringing devices (electroshock cartridges).  Whether Taser will ever see any money from this judgment is another question entirely.  Moral of the story, Court orders are not something to be ignored.

Motion for Sanctions, granted.
Taser International, Inc. v. Phazzer Electronics, Inc., Case No. 6:16-cv-366-Orl-40KRS (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2018) (J. Byron)

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Request for 2 Day Extension To Oppose Summary Judgment Motion?

Denied.  Ouch.

Commodores Entertainment Corporation has sued Thomas McClary, a former Commodores band member, for various trademark claims.  Commodores sought summary judgment.  Procedurally, McClary's attorney requested a first extension of 8 days for McClary to respond to the dispositive summary judgment motion.  The Commodores did not oppose the request and the Court granted it.

During that 8-day period, McClary's counsel attended a hearing in California state court in San Diego.  During that hearing, the California state court set a case for jury trial where McClary's counsel is lead trial.  That jury trial was set to begin on July 6 - the day after McClary's summary judgment response was due.

On the day of the summary judgment response deadline (July 5), McClary's counsel sought a 2-day extension of time to respond to the summary judgment motion.   Again, the Commodores did not oppose the request.    The next day (after the deadline has passed), the Court denied the motion with the following docket entry:
ENDORSED ORDER denying 415 Motion. Counsel has not demonstrated good cause for the requested second extension. Defendants have other counsel of record who could have assisted. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 7/6/2018. (ZRR) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
Ouch.  Later that day, McClary submitted its summary judgment response brief.  And a few days later, McClary filed an unopposed motion requesting the brief be accepted as timely.  The Court has not yet ruled on that request.

As a practice pointer, it is difficult for the Courts to rule on requested extensions on the day of a particular deadline, and I have not studied the history of this case to see how well it has progressed.  But I presume the merits of the case will get resolved.

*** Update 7/10/2018 ***
The Court resolved McClary's request to accept the summary judgment
ENDORSED ORDER granting in part and denying in part 418 Motion Relief From Order, And To Accept Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment As Timely Filed. The Response in Opposition will be considered as timely filed. In all other respects the motion is denied. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 7/10/2018. (Dalton, Jr., Roy) (Entered: 07/10/2018)

Commodores Entertainment Corporation v McClary, Case No. 6:14-cv-01335-RBD-GJK (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2018) (J. Dalton, Jr.)

Thursday, September 28, 2017

Want To Pursue Attorneys Fees After Invalidating A Patent in Front of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board?

Not so fast.  If the case is moot because all of the claims have been extinguished, you may have foregone your ability to pursue discovery to support your claim for attorneys fees in federal court.

MD Security Solutions, LLC sued Protection 1, Inc. for alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,864,983 concerning a security alarm system.  Protection 1 asserted the standard counterclaims seeking declarations of invalidity and noninfringement.  A third party (RPX, Corp., a patent risk management company) filed a request for inter partes review seeking to cancel the claims of the '983 Patent.  Protection 1 filed its own IPR as well (which was essentially the same as RPX's), and also joined in RPX's IPR.   Protection 1 agreed to be bound by whatever happened with RPX's IPR.  The parties in the federal case then jointly asked the Court to stay the case pending the PTAB proceedings.

The PTAB issued a final written decision finding all claims of the '983 Patent invalid.  MD Security did not appeal.  MD Security asked that the stay be lifted and the Court dismiss its claims.  Protection 1 asked for a short discovery period to pursue a claim for attorneys fees because "[i]n short, [Protection 1] argues the Plaintiff and both of its principals are patent trolls."

The Court first explained the law of mootness:
“A case is moot when events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the [party] meaningful relief.” National Ass’nof Boards of Pharmacy v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Jews for Jesus, Inc. V. Hillsborough Cnty.Aviation Authority., 162 F.3d 627, 629 (11th Cir. 1998). As the Court in Nat. Ass’n of Bds of Pharmacy observed: 
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of “Cases” and “Controversies.”… [A] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief. If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit … that deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff … meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed. Id. at 1309 (citations omitted).

The Court then determined the case was moot, and denied Protection 1's request to pursue discovery in support of its fee claim:

Once the ‘983 patent was determined to be unpatentable, the need for a declaratory judgement of invalidity and non-infringement became a moot issue. The parties do not disagree that a device cannot infringe a patent deemed to be unpatentable. Similarly, there is no need for a judicial determination that the ‘983 patent is invalid, since that very issue has been conclusively resolved in favor of the Defendant. Once the case is moot, the Court lacks the ability to permit discovery and the case must be dismissed. If the Defendant had desired to conduct discovery to prove the egregious conduct alleged in their response to the Order to Show Cause, they should not have joined in the IPR, nor should they have filed a separate petition for IPR of all claims of the ‘983 patent on the same grounds described in the then-pending IPR. Having chosen to invalidate the ‘983 patent before the USPTO, they cannot now complain that they are denied the ability to avail themselves of this federal forum
Case dismissed, but Protection 1 may file briefing on the issue of its entitlement to fees and/or costs.

MD Security Solutions, LLC v Protection 1, Inc., Case No. 6:15-CV-1968-ORL-40GJK (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2017) (J. Byron)

Tuesday, November 22, 2016

They're Alive! Breathing Life Back Into Our Patent System?

I wrote an article last year in The Tampa Tribune entitled "The Death of American Innovation?" discussing the impact of the America Invents Act (passed in 2011) on the validity and enforceability of patents in our country.   One of the tools put in place through that Act is the ability to challenge (and eventually kill) patents that are purportedly directed to "Covered Business Methods."

The Act defined "Covered Business Methods" as methods "for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service."  As I mentioned in the article, to challenge a patent using this system, a challenger must pay the Patent Office a significant filing fee (currently $30,000).

When asked to review a patent under this "Covered Business Method" review system, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) was first tasked with determining whether or not a patent was directed to a "Covered Business Method."  Instead of relying just on the language above, the PTAB instead focused on whether the claimed invention was directed to activities "that are financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity, or complementary to a financial activity."  Such a standard is significantly broader, and obviously swallowed up significantly more patents than just those directed only to data processing or the like in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product itself.

Yesterday, the Federal Circuit (hopefully) put an end to this overreaching by the PTAB.  Using an example I've used myself, the Federal Circuit explained the fallacy of such overbreadth:

The patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in bank vault does not become a CBM patent because of its incidental or complementary use in banks.  Likewise, it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service.  All patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or service.  Take, for example, a patent for an apparatus for digging ditches.  Does the sale of the dirt that results from use of the ditch digger render the patent a CBM patent?  No, because the claims of the ditch-digging method or apparatus are not directed to "performing data processing or other operations" or "used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service," as required b y the statute.

The PTAB's reliance on its "incidental to" or "complementary to" a financial activity standard was not proper under the law, and is no more.  This is certainly a victory to those patent owners facing CBM Petitions and appealing recent adverse rulings from the PTAB.

Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google, Inc., Case No 2015-1812, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2016)

Monday, March 28, 2016

Florida's Patent Troll Act

Last year, Florida (like a few other states) passed a "Patent Troll Prevention Act."  Fla. Stat. 501.991 et seq.  The act sought to discourage "bad faith" assertion of patent rights in Florida.  The Legislature described its goal:
Patents encourage research, development, and innovation. Patent holders have a legitimate right to enforce their patents. The Legislature does not wish to interfere with good faith patent litigation or the good faith enforcement of patents. However, the Legislature recognizes a growing issue: the frivolous filing of bad faith patent claims that have led to technical, complex, and especially expensive litigation.
Fla. Stat. 501.991(2) (2015).  The law created a number of tools patent infringement defendants (and other recipients of demand letters) could use to ward off expensive patent litigation.  These tools included requiring the patent owner to post a bond of up to $250,000 to proceed with the case as well as punitive damages.  But the law did not clearly define what a "bad faith assertion of patent infringement" was.  This uncertainty made it difficult to enforce patent rights in Florida as the patent owner was likely subjected to the damages and bond provisions of the act.

I currently serve as Chair of the Florida Bar Business Law Section's Intellectual Property Committee.  One of our legislative priorities this year was to work on fixes to this law to more properly strike a balance between legitimate enforcement of patent rights and the behavior sought to be discouraged by the law.  To that end, I testified in front of a number of Florida legislative committees to help with passage of fixes to the law.  I am happy to report that House Bill 1181 was passed (unanimously by both Houses of Florida's Legislature) and signed into law last week by the Governor.  This amended law took effect immediately and includes a number of improvements.

First, there is no longer a bond component, meaning a patent owner will not be subjected to litigating whether or not it should post a bond of up to $250,000 simply to ask a court to resolve its patent infringement claim.

Second, the act specifically defines what a patent owner can do to make sure its demand is not a "bad faith" assertion of patent rights.  For a demand letter (which includes an email) to be a "bad faith assertion of patent infringement" it must:

  1. Include a claim that the target (i.e. the recipient of the letter) has infringed a patent and is liable for the infringement; and
  2. Meet one or more of the following criteria:
    1. It falsely claims that a lawsuit has been filed; or
    2. It asserts an "objectively baseless" claim because:
      1. The sender doesn't have a right to assert the patent;
      2. The patent has been held invalid in a final judgment or administrative order; or
      3. The alleged infringement took place after the patent expired.
    3. It is likely to materially mislead because it does not contain enough information to determine:
      1. The identity of the person asserting the patent;
      2. Which patent is alleged to be infringed; and
      3. At least one allegedly infringing product or service.

Fla. Stat. 501.993 (2016).

Third, the act makes clear that it does not interfere with a party's ability to license its patents, by specifically indicating that the act does not prohibit:

  1. Notifying other parties of a person's ownership or rights under a patent
  2. Offering the patent to others for license or sale
  3. Notifying someone that they infringe the patent; or
  4. Seeking compensation for infringement of the patent

Fla. Stat. 501.991(4) (2016).

Fourth, the act revises the criteria for punitive damages in an effort to focus the act on the nefarious behavior sought to be discouraged.  Now, to pursue punitive damages, the violator must be a repeated violator of the law.  Thus, a small entity that only asserts a single claim should be free from the law's restrictions.

It will be interesting to see how this law continues to develop in Florida and throughout the country.

Fla. Chapter 2016-101.

Thursday, February 18, 2016

Uber in Gainesville? Not So Fast...

This will be my first post on a case from outside the Middle District of Florida, but instead comes from the Northern District.  I'll let the Judge provide the intro:
You live in Gainesville and need to book a party bus, or perhaps a non-party bus or a limo to take a number of people to an event. You run a Google search for “Gainesville party bus” and, not satisfied with any of the offerings on page one of the results, turn to page two. There is a listing there for “Uber Promotions.” Thinking that perhaps this is somehow affiliated with Uber, a nationally known taxi-like service that has recently come to town, you click on the link. You are taken to a webpage with a bright green and purple “├╝ber PROMOTIONS” logo. The crux of this trademark infringement case is (roughly speaking) whether you could reasonably conclude that Uber Promotions and Uber the taxi- like service are in some way connected. 
This case pits a Gainesville, Florida company (Uber Promotions, Inc.) ("Promotions") against the nationally known Uber Technologies, Inc. ("Tech"), an on-demand car service.   Tech began in a few cities, but has exponentially expanded over the last few years.  Tech's first foray into Florida was in Tampa [ed - thus the Middle District of Florida connection!] during the Republican National Convention in 2012.  

Promotions has been operating in Gainesville since 2006. Concerned that the junior user (Tech) was encroaching into its space in Gainesville, Promotions filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Tech from operating in Gainesville.  This is an interesting case for showing a senior user relying on common law rights in a particular geographic area to fend off or stop a junior user relying on federal trademark rights (and the respective zones of natural expansion of the two rights holders).  The Court described the respective sizes of the companies in colorful language:
Elephants don't look out for gerbils when they plow through the bush.
Apparently Tech has unveiled a new service, called UberEVENTS, that allows you to purchase a ride for others that can be used at a particular time in the future.   It was this new service that the Court decided was preventable (at least pending trial), as a broader injunction seeking to stop Uber altogether in Gainesville was too broad.  Again, the Court used useful prose:
Arming Squirrels with Bazookas
The Court addressed the preliminary injunction factors and ultimately concluded that a narrow  injunction was proper to requiring Tech to:
  • stop using the UBER mark (or any variant thereof) in connection with the UberEVENTS service in the Gainesville market (Alachua County) until further notice
  • not advertise the UberEVENTS service in Alachua County or cause it to be advertised in Alachua County until further notice.  A posting promoting UberEVENTS placed on the Facebook wall or page of an entity with its principal place of business in Alachua County is an advertisement.  A posting promoting UberEVENTS placed on the Facebook wall or page of a real person whose usual place of abode or residence is in Alachua County is an advertisement.
  • ensure that if a person attempts to book an event in Alachua County through the UberEVENTS webpage, that booking is not allowed to be completed.
  • set up a 352-area-code phone number to handle phone calls
  • make sure that internet searches for the phrase "Uber Gainesville phone" or "Uber Gainesville phone number" returns Defendant's 352-area-code number along with words clearly indicating that the results are clearly Defendants
(The injunction further required Tech to buy Google AdWords (or similar products) if necessarily to accomplish the injunction search result obligations.)  

I'm certain this case is far from done.  Stay tuned...